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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
A. ROBERT COLLINS and 
GLADE N. JAMES, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
EDWARD 0. BAILEY and 
RUTH C. BAILEY, his wife, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 16648 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiffs-respondents, hereinafter 
referred to as "plaintiffs", for judgment as follows: 
"l. That an order to show cause issue immediately 
requiring the defendants to appear and show 
cause, if any they have, why they should not 
be restrained from forfeiting the rights under 
said contract until the court has had a full 
hearing in this matter and entered its judgment 
declaring the rights of the parties. 
"2. For a declaratory judgment declaring that the 
terms and conditions of the real estate contract 
which is Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint 
have not been violated and that payments there-
under may continue pursuant to the terms thereof." 
(Prayer of Compl.:J.ir.t, P.3) 
Edward O. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey, his wife, hereinafter 
referred to as "Baileys" contend that plaintiffs have breached 
the provisions of said contract and pray for judgment against 
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plaintiffs: 
a. No cause of action against plaintiffs and for 
costs and a reasonable attorney fee. (p.24) 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Each of the parties submitted the matter pursuant to 
motions for summary judgments by the respective parties and a 
motion for attorney's fees by Baileys for enforcement of the 
contract under paragraph 21 of said contract which reads: 
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should th< 
default in any of the covenants or agreements contair 
herein, that the defaultin art shall a all cost; 
an expenses, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing this 
Agreement, or in obtaining possession of the premise; 
covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by the Statutes of the State of Utah 
whether such remedy is pursued by filing a suit or 
otherwise." (underscore added) 
The court granted plaintiffs-respondents motion for ; 
judgment and denied defendants-appellants motions. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of the granted motion for summary judgment 
and the granting of the motion for summary judgment of defendant 
and motion for costs and attorney's fees for enforcing said 
contract provision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Baileys and C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporat 
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designated as Buyer, made and entered a contract entitled Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, designated as Exhibit "A" (p.6) on the 
13th day of April, 1978, for the purchase of the following described 
lands in Salt Lake County, State of U~ah, to-wit: 
All of Lots 17, 18, 19, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33 
and 34, Block 6, Longview Park Addition, as 
recorded in the office of the County Recorder of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, subject to 
existing rights of way. (Exhibit M-D-1) (p. 6 and 53) 
Three of said lots face on State Street and have a 
business building thereon, and eight of said lots are in the rear 
across the alley and had a storage building and were used for 
parking. (p.53) 
To definitely fix the persons responsible, Baileys 
required a Guaranty (p.25) by and between said Baileys and A. 
Robert Collins and Glade N. James, "principal officers" of said 
corporation, wherein it was covenanted and agreed: 
"Buyer, and A. Robert Collins and Glade N. James 
are each jointly and individually bound to satisfy 
the obligations of said C & J Industries, Incorporated, 
under the terms of said Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
and to perform each of the covenants and agreements 
therein. 
"Each and all of the parties to said Uniform Real Estate 
Contract are each severally and jointly bound to per-
form the obligations, covenants and agreements of said 
contract, said Edward 0. Bailey and Ruth C. Bailey, 
his wife, as Seller, and said C & J Industries Incor-
porated, a corporation, as Buyer, and said A. Robert 
Collins and Glade N. James individually and jointly." 
(Exhibit D-1 attached to Answer) (p.25) 
That paragraph 3(a) of said Uniform Real Estate Contract, 
Exhibit A, provides in part: 
-3-
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"In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign, 
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this contrac 
or Buyer's interest in said premises, then and in th 
event the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding 
balance due on this contract prior to said transacti 
(underscore added) (p.6) 
On or about March 9, 1979, plaintiffs, Collins and 
James, not the Buyers under said contract, but the Guarantors, 
sold a portion of the subject real property and said office 
building located thereon to one Jay L. Burgie pursuant to a Uni: 
Real Estate Contract dated March 9, 1979, a copy of which contr 
is attached to the Complaint herein and marked as Exhibit B, 
(p .10) and said contract contemplated the transfer of three lot: 
containing the building and all State Street-facing 
nroperty (p.10), Lots 17, 18 and 19 of Block 6, Ten-Acre Plat"; 
Big Field Survey of Longview Park Addition. (p.53) 
Under date of March 19, 1979, counsel for Baileys 
mailed a letter (p.54) to each of plaintiffs advising of the 
breach and asking it to be corrected. (p.54) 
Baileys thereafter had prepared and served upon C & c 
Industries Incorporated, on April 4, 1979, upon A. Robert Collir 
on April 5, 1979, and upon Glade N. James on April 9, 1979, a 
"NOTICE TO REINSTATE THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT TO PURCHASE BY 
PAYMENT OF ALL DELINQUENT AMOUNTS DUE AND OWING BY VIRTUE OF Tffi 
SALE OF THE PROPERTY SUBJECT TO SAID CONTRACT OR FORFEIT ALL RIG 
UNDER SAID CONTRACT". (p .13) Exhibit C. Said Notices set fort 
said subparagraph (a) of Paragraph 3 of said Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and stated: 
-4-
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"That said Jay L. Burgie, dba Ogden Beauty Supply 
Company has reputedly purchased a portion of said 
real property in contravention of said agreement 
in that said 'the full and outstanding balance due 
on this contract prior to said transaction' has not 
been paid. 
"In contravention of said specific provision of said 
contract rights of said Buyer and interests of said 
Buyer in said described properties have been sold, 
or assigned or transferred or conveyed without the 
'outstanding balance due on said contra~t' having 
been paid to Buyer 'prior to said transaction.' 
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT WITHIN THIRTY DAYS AFTER 
SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE UPON YOU, SAID CONTRACT MUST 
BE REINSTATED BY THE PAYMENT OF SELLER 'IN FULL THE 
OUTSTANDING BALANCE DUE ON THIS CONTRACT'. 
"NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT IF YOU CLAIM ANY RIGHTS 
UNDER SAID CONTRACT, IF THE PAYMENT IN FULL IS NOT 
PAID WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME, NAMELY 30 DAYS, YOU 
AND EACH OF YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT SAID CONTRACT 
OF SALE IS TO BE TERMINATED AND CANCELLED BY REASON 
OF SAID BREACH OF SAID CONTRACT AND REFUSAL TO PAY 
THE FULL AMOUNT DUE AND OWING AND BY REASON OF SAID 
REJECTION OF THE OFFER TO REINSTATE SAID CONTRACT." 
(Exhibit C) (p. 13) 
On April 26, 1979, plaintiffs filed the subject action 
asking for an Order to Show Cause why a restraining order should 
not issue restraining defendants from declaring a forfeiture 
i.mder the terms of said contract and for a declaratory judgment, 
and hearing was set for may 10, 1979, before the above entitled 
court with the Honorable Christine M. Durham, Judge presiding. 
Paragraph 5 of said contract provides: 
"5. It is i.mderstood and agreed that if the Seller 
accepts payment from the Buyer on this contract less 
than according to the terms herein mentioned, then 
by so doina, it will in no way alter the terms of 
the contra~t as to the forfeiture hereinafter stipulated, 
o:c as to any other remedies of the Seller." 
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provides: 
Paragraph 21 of said Uniform Real Estate Contract 
"21. The Buyer and Seller each agree that should 
they default in any of the covenants or agreements 
contained herein that the defaulting party shall 
pay all costs and expenses, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforc 
this agreement, or in obtaining possession of the 
premises covered hereby, or in pursuing any remedy 
provided hereunder or by the statutes of the State 
of Utah whether such remedy is pursued by filing 
a suit or otherwise." 
Attached to the Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment was the record of payments sheet showing the 
payment number of each and every payment made under said contrac 
with the first payment due June l, 1978, and the written acknowl 
ment of payments made which are underlined and how payments 
made through May, 1979, were applied and the balance due and 
owing on May l, 1979, which is $213,034.41. 
(p.55) 
(Exhibit M-D-3). 
Hearing was had on said May 10, 1979, on said Order 
to Show Cause. The court ruled that a restraining order at 
that time did not seem proper. 
In order to facilitate the disposition of the matter, 
the couttsaid that each of the parties might file a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and that the parties might "get together on 
the facts". Motions were filed. (p.19, p. 28) Hearing on 
said Motions was set for May 25, 1979, at 3:00 p.m. before the 
court. Counsel were invited to file written memorandum, if 
they chose. Written Memorandum were filed. (p. 30, 43) An affidi 
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in support of motion for attorney's fees to enforce terms of 
contract was filed. (p. 84) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract, the subject of 
this action, was signed and agreed to by all parties to this 
action. Each, individually signed the same, each of the Baileys, 
C & J Industries Incorporated, by its officers, A. Robert Collins 
and Glade N. James, individually. (p. 9) 
It should be noted that the Buyer under the contract 
was C & J Industries Incorporated, a corporation, (p.6) and 
the Seller under the purported contract of sale was Glade N. 
James and A. Robert Collins. (Exhibit B) (p.10) How the parties 
are switching the ownership around is not clear. How the property 
was sold, transferred or assigned or how much is not known. 
There had to be some. The Buyer under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, (Exhibit A) (p.6) is not the Seller of the premises 
in the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Glade N. James and 
A. Robert Collins and Jay L. Burgie. (Exhibit B) (p.10) 
The Guaranty, (p.15) signed by the parties was to 
make each of the parties personally and jointly responsible 
for the performance of said contract. (Exhibit D-l)(p.25) Unknown 
persons who were responsible for the corporation were made definite 
by the Guaranty. 
Paragraph 3 of said contract (p.6) reads: 
"3. Said Buyer hereby agrees to enter into possession 
and pay for said described premises the sum of Two 
-7-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Hundred Twenty Thousand Dollars ($220,000.00) payabl 
at the office of the Seller, his assigns, or order 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, strictly within the followi 
times, to-wit: Two Hundred and Ninety-seven Dollars 
and 31/100 ($2,297.31) per month commencing June 1, 
1978. 
(a) In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign, 
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this con-
tract or Buyer's interest in said premises then 
and in that event the Buyer must pay in full the 
outstanding balance due on this contract prior 
to said transaction . . " (underscore added) (p. 6, 
In Black's Law Dictionary, we read: 
"With respect to ownership of external objects of 
property, rights may be classed as absolute and quaL 
fied. An absolute right gives to the person in whom 
it inheres the uncontrolled dominion over the object 
at all times and for all purposes. A qualified right 
gives the possessor a right to the object for certair 
purposes or under certain circumstances only." 
(Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1559-under Classificatic 
The Buyer took the subject property subject to the terms of the 
contract which imposed conditions. C & J Industries Inc. purcru 
the property subject to the conditions of paragraph 3(a). Bas~ 
on the facts and documents before the court, Glade N. James and 
A. Robert Collins have no rights or interests in these premises 
or in the contract. The court must assume a sale, assignment, c 
conveyance of C & J Industries, Inc. rights or interests to 
Glade N. James and A. Robert Collins in order for them to enter 
the contract executed by them on March 9, 1979. (Exhibit B) (p. 
If there were a sale, assignment or conveyance by C & J Industri 
Inc. to Glade N. James and A. Robert Collins, then it was a brei 
of paragraph 3 (a). That paragraph requires that "prior to said 
transaction" the "Buyer must pay in full the outstanding balance' 
-8-
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Section 22 of said contract provides: 
"22. It is understood that the stipulations aforesaid 
are to apply to and bind the heirs, executors, admin-
istrators, successors, and assigns of the respective 
parties hereto." 
Section 19, of said contract provides, in part: 
"19. The Seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner 
above mentioned agrees to execute and deliver to the 
Buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty 
deed conveying the title to the above described pre-
mises free and clear of all encumbrances . . " 
C & J Industries Inc. had the right to assign its "rights" 
and "interests". The contrary is not contended. However, prior to 
said "sale, assignment, transfer or conveyance" the "buyer must 
pay in full the outstanding balance due c:i this contract." If 
"buyer desires to sell or assign, transfer or convey Buyer's 
rights under this contract or buyer's interest in said premises 
then and in that event the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding 
balance due on this contract prior to said transaction." What could 
be more clear? All parties signed this contract with this 
limitation. The sale to Burgie was all of the business building 
and property facing on State Street, the main thoroughfare. The 
retained portion is rear property consisting of parking space and 
warehouse space. 
The key to this business property is the front store. 
The contract does not provide that a portion of the property may 
be ~old, assigned or transferred or conveyed. The contract 
specifically provides that if "the Buyer's interest in the premises 
-9-
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is sold, assigned or transferred or conveyed the Buyer must pay 
in full the outstanding balance." 
The Seller is not trying to restrict the rights of e 
Buyer. This was agreed to in writing. Jay L. Burgie, is not t': 
one Seller is looking to "not to commit or suffer to be committ1 
any waste, spoil, or destruction in or upon said premises." (p. 
Buyer can assign or sell to whom Buyer pleases but when Buyer 
does, Seller is to receive "pay in full of the outstanding balar 
In the instant case, "Buyer's interest in said premi: 
was sold. It was no one else's interest. It was "buyer's inter 
even though buyer was retaining some additional interest, but 
buyer was selling "Buyer's interest." 
What havoc the courts would wrought if parties were 
permitted to sell, assign or transfer part of the properties sol 
when parties had agreed not to sell, assign or transfer the pro· 
perties purchased. If one contracts not to sell the property, 
can a court of law permit one to sell part of it, and part of it 
again, and part of it again until for all practical purposes it 
is all sold. When one contracts not to sell a piece of properq 
and courts cannot authorize the sale of part of the property. 
Pandora's box would certainly be opened. 
POINT II 
THE PHRASE "RIGHTS OR INTERESTS" DOES NOT MEAN ALL 
RIGHTS OR ALL INTERESTS, BUT INCLUDES A PART OR PORT! 
The contract executed between the parties was designe 
-10-
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t: 
in part, to protect defendants against third parties obtaining 
rights in the property over which defendants had no control. 
To avoid that undesirable position, defendants required plaintiffs 
to pay the balance of the contract price in the event plaintiffs 
sold, transferred or assigned their interest in the property. 
This was the only protection defendants had from outside parties 
with whom they had no privity of contract. 
ir Plaintiffs have argued that "rights" and "Interests" 
ls refer to "all of their rights" or "all of their interests" and not 
!! just a portion of them. The contract does not so provide. Each 
part is contained within the whole and when a condition applies 
to the whole it applies to each part. Plaintiffs contend that it 
would be ridiculous under defendants' interpretation of the 
contract to completely pay the balance of the contract if they sold 
or assigned one square foot of property. The choice is with the 
plaintiffs, plaintiffs need not sell. Plaintiffs reasoned that they 
could sell all but one square foot of property without paying off 
the contract since they would still own an interest in the pro-
perty. 
In attempting to determine the definition of "right" 
or "interest", counsel was unable to find a Utah case in point. 
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court defined "interest in land" 
in "In Re Rood's Estate, 38 N.W. 2d 70, 229 Minn. 73 (1949) as 
follows: 
"In the instant case, the prayer for relief 
presented to the court the broad issue of declaring 
-11-
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or ascertaining the title or interest of the applier 
in the land. Obviousry;-the applicant's interest in 
the land could not be determined without giving 
consideration to the validity and extent of all encu 
brances. 'Interest in land' is a broad term which 
may refer to any one of a variety of estates or 
fractional shares in realty. It may refer to the nr 
equity or fractional property value possessed by the 
owner over and above the sum total unpaid on out-
standing encumbrances." (emphasis added) 
ACCELERATION CLAUSES 
To argue that Acceleration Clauses are against publi. 
policy or illegal would be specious. All of the parties agreed 
the acceleration clause in writing. 
Baileys sold to C & J Industries Inc. without any do1 
payment. The monthly payments were a small fraction over one p1 
of the purchase price. When interest rates were six percent pe: 
annum rent was usually figured at one percent per month of the 
purchase price or fair market value. That was the way a fair 
computation of the rental value was figured. With interest rat1 
soaring to fifteen and three-quarters percent prime rate, the 
one percent per annum would not be feasible. No bank would mak1 
such a loan as there is no profit margin or inf la ti on considere1 
This loan was made under the most favorable of conditions to th1 
buyer. The contract protected the seller against having anythi: 
to do with any other buyer, assignee, transferee or purchaser. 
That is a fair, legal and legitimate condition to a contract. 
The only party capable of accelerating payment was C & J Indust: 
Inc. The contract was written for that express purpose. That 
was the purpose of subsection 3(a). 
There is no question of fraud, or the lack of knowin1 
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the terms of the contract. There is a desire to abrogate the 
terms of the contract. 
The court went on to state in Peck v. Judd, 326 P.2d 712, 
7 Utah Zd 420: 
"It is not our prerogative to step in and renegotiate 
the contract of the parties. It may be conceded that 
with an advantaged background we may be able to improve 
on their work and considering the changed times and 
conditions say what now appears to us to be fair under 
such conditions. Possibly at least one of the parties 
would agree. There is no reason why we should consider 
the vendee privileged and entitled to our intervention 
unless the conditions sought to be imposed on the 
vendee are unconscionable . . . 
"Further than to determine if enforcement of the 
contract results in gross inequity, and unless and 
until the enforcement would be highly unconscionable, 
we should recognize and honor the right of persons to 
contract freely and to make rea~ and genuine mistakes 
when the dealings are at arm's length." 
The provisions of Section 3(a) (b) and (c) are not 
provisions of the standard Uniform Real Estate Contract. This 
contract was typed to specifically include paragraph 3(a). There 
is no question of fraud, unconscionable advantage taken, or deceit. 
This contract provided simply that the Seller would deal only 
with the buyer. In the event buyer wanted to unload the contract 
or take advantage of a sale that the seller must be paid out in full. 
The Buyer could sell to anyone buyer chose upon such terms as buyer 
might desire. The buyer's interest in the contract and the premises 
was so tied that if the buyer wanted out, the seller wanted out 
first. There is nothing fraudulent or unconscionable about that 
situation. 
-13-
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SALE OR EXECUTORY CONTRACT 
In the Supplemental Memorandum counsel for plaintifi 
quoted in part from 67 Am Jur 2d, "Sales", Section 8, in an att 
to differentiate between a sale and an executory sale. How eve 
the final paragraph of Section 8 which plaintiffs omitted, clar 
the artificial distinction between a sale and a contract for sal 
It states as follows: 
" . . . Although the Uniform Commercial Code defines 
'contract for sale' separately from 'present sale,' 
no distinction is made between the rights of the par 
according to whether the transaction is a present sa 
or a contract to sell, unless a provision of Article 
expressly so provides. In short, pre-Code distincti 
between a sale and contract to sell will continue un 
the Uniform Commercial Code; but the distinction is 
theoretical for most purposes, since the passing of 
title is of relatively little importance under the 
Code." 
This section specifically states that no distinction 
is made between the rights of the parties under either contract 
form unless provided for by a provision of Article II. However 
Article II of the Utah Commercial Code applies only to goods ~. 
not the sale of real property. Since the present case involves 
the transfer of real property, it is immaterial whether the 
transfer of property was a sale or a contract for sale because 
rights of the parties remain the same under both. 
Plaintiffs further allege that transfer of title is 
the key issue. Section 8 states that the passing of title is 
relatively unimportant. We agree. In most real estate transac· 
the buyer rarely acquires title to the property he is purchasin! 
unless he pays cash. Real estate contracts are used extensive! 
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throughout Utah with the seller retaining title until the purchase 
price has been paid. That does not mean that the buyer does not 
have rights or interest in the property. Obviously, in the instant 
case the buyer acquired some right or interest in the property 
because they transferred a portion of it for value to a third party. 
Whether the contract between plaintiffs and defendants is considered 
a sale or a contract for sale becomes meaningless, since plaintiffs' 
rights under either are the same. 
FORFEITURE 
Defendants filed an Affidavit in Answer to Verified 
Complaint on Order to Show Cause setting forth that defendants' 
action "is not to forfeit the Uniform Real Estate Contract, but to 
require plaintiffs to abide by the terms of said contract and 
particularly paragraph 3(a); that a restraining order should not 
issue to restrain or enjoin defendants from enforcing the contract; 
and that defendants are entitled to take such steps as may be 
necessary to enforce a legally binding contract."(p.20) The answer 
to the complaint simply asks that judgment be entered against 
plaintiffs of no cause of action, plus costs and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. (p.24) 
One must not lose sight of the fact that defendants 
are trying to retain the right to enforce a contract. Plaintiffs' 
action is an attempt to stop the enforcement of the contract. 
There is no element in the pleadings any place of a proceeding 
toward forfeiture. 
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The trial court asked that two questions be briefed 
subject action: 
1. Must the defendants pay the plaintiffs for the 
improvements made on the property by the plaintiffs 
during the time that the plaintiffs are in possessio 
under contract in the event there is a default and 
the defendants institute an action to declare a 
forfeiture under the contract? 
2. Did the entering of the contract to sell three 
the eleven lots for over seventy-five percent of the 
original sellers sale price constitute a sale of the 
property under the terms of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. (see page 14) 
This doctrine found its origin in Utah law in the ca: 
of Christy v. Guild, 101 Utah 313, 121 P.2d 401. At that time 
was the law clerk to the Chief Justice. Christy sold the premi: 
to Guild under contract in 1935. Guilds were to pay $3,200.00 
for the property in monthly installments of $30. 00 including bo: 
principal and interest. Guild agreed to make improvements on 
home and pay taxes. Default was declared because of failure 
to make payments, failure to make improvements and payment of 
taxes. Compliance with the notice to correct defaults was igno: 
Suit was filed for the breach and forfeiture sought. 
Guild was required by the contract to make improveme: 
on the property and did, in the approximate amount of $2,000.00 
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The court noted that a credit for the improvements made were 
more than absorbed in the monthly income from the property. No 
award for improvements was made. It was only considered. 
The landmark case in Utah law on this subject is Perkins 
vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P.2d 446, wherein Perkins contracted 
to pay $10,500.00 for the home, $2,500.00 down and the balance 
at $75.00 per month until Perkins sold their home in Bountiful, Utah. 
Perkins then were to pay off the balance. The sale was on a 
standard Uniform Real Estate Contract. Perkins sold their home, 
but were unable to pay off the balance. Perkins v. Spencer is a 
claim for forfeiture case. THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT IS NOT FOR 
FORFEITURE. This is a case to enforce the contract as writte~ 
and as agreed in writing between the parties. 
The court was concerned as to what would happen if the 
case went to forfeiture. Sellers DO NOT want forfeiture because 
the rule laid down in Perkins v. Spencer, supra, as to how to 
apply a forfeiture is as follows: 
"(9) The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned 
by them by any of these factors: 
(1) Loss of an advantageous bargain; 
(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the property; 
(3) Any decline in value due to change in market 
value of the property not allowed for in items 
1 and 2; and 
(4) For the fair rental value of the property 
during the period of occupancy. 
The total of such si.nns should be deducted from the 
total amount paid in, PLUS ANY IMPROVEMENTS FOR WHICH 
IT WOULD BE FAIR TO ALLOW RECOVERY, and any remaining 
difference awarded to the plaintiffs." 
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In the case before the court, the monthly payments a 
$2,297.31 on a purchase price of $220,000.00 with no down payme 
One percent of the value of commercial property is usually cons: 
the fair rental value. In other words, Baileys are getting the 
fair rental value in the monthly payments. Buyer claims a 
$45,000.00 improvement on the property. Where are the Baileys, 
retiring out of their business, going to come up with the $45,0 
for the improvements? Seller wants out, not the property. Th, 
is no way Seller can declare a forfeiture and come up with the 
$45,000.00. 
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, is a forfeiture case and! 
been cited in twenty-six Utah cases on review and two federal 
cases as well asin the Utah Law Review. The citations are in: 
Scoville v. Kellogg Sales Co., 1 Utah 2d 18, 261 P.~ 
Pearce v. Shurtz, 2 Utah 2d 130, 270 P.2d 442 
Jacobson v. Swann, 3 Utah 2d 65, 278 P.2d 294 
Cole v. Parker, 5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P.2d 623 
Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah 2d 84, 305 P.2d 882 
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989 
Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P.2d 404 
Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 
Van Zyverden v. Farrar, 15 Utah 2d 367, 393 P.2d 468 
Nagle v. Fontainbleu, 17 Utah 2d 125, 405 P.2d 346 
U-Beva Mines v. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Utah 2d 351, 
471 P.2d 867 
Jensen v. Nielsen, 26 Utah 2d 96, 485 P.2d 673 
Corporation Nine, Inc. v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 53, 513 
Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corporation, 548 P.2d 889 
Kay v. Wood, 549 P.2d 709 
Young Electric Sign Company v. Vegas, 564 P.2d 758 
Johnson v. Carman, 572 P.2d 371 
Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712 
Biesinger v. Behunin, 584 P.2d 801 
Chu:nney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P.2d 84 
9 ULR 919 
227 F 2d 637 
147 FS 247 
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Counsel has taken two cases under Uniform Real Estate 
Contracts to the Supreme Court, bearing on forfeiture and improvements 
namely: Peck v. Judd, 7 Utah 2d 420, 326 P.2d 712, and Biesinger v. 
Behunin, 584 P.2d 801. The question of the Buyer being given 
credit for improvements was raised in each case. In each instance 
it was shown that the loss of the Seller exceeded the improvements 
made. In the instant case, not permitting the seller to require 
buyer to abide by the contract may require sellers, who have 
retired, to pay buyer $45,000.00 for improvements, which they 
do not have. One must give credence to paragraph 3(a) as it is 
a special condition written into the contract to protect Baileys 
and all parties agreed to it. 
At Christmas I found myself trying to put toys together 
for the children and was getting nowhere. In the yard, I find 
myself trying to put a new implement or tool together and get 
confused. Usually, my wife sees my plight and will come over gently 
and pick up the instructions and read them to me with the admonition, 
"when all else fails, read the instructions." Let's read the 
paragraph; it states: 
"3. 
(a) In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign 
transfer or convey Buyer's rignts under this 
contract or Buyer's interest in said premises then 
and in that event the Bu"e.,.. must pay in full 
the outstanding balance due on said contract prior 
to said transaction." 
What does the instruction state? (1) "In the event buyer desires 
to sell or assign", does not mean after he has sold, after he has 
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assigned, but when the idea has been concluded to sell or assiw. 
(2) "buyer's interest in said premises", not to sell or assign 
someone elses interest but "buyer's interest in said premises", 
(3) "Buyer must pay in full" the "outstanding balance" due; 
(4) when must this be done? "Prior to said transaction". When 
the buyer has the "desire" buyer "must pay in full" "prior to tr 
transaction". 
Counsel was the author of said paragraph. The intent 
is expressed in the buyer's "desire" to "sell or assign". Buyer 
certainly had the desire but "prior to the transaction", priori 
doing anything about it, Buyer "must pay" the seller "in full tr 
outstanding balance" on the contract. Reason would dictate that 
when the money starts passing from all parties Baileys get their 
first. It does not provide Baileys can be ignored. 
After two trips to the Supreme Court, one learns. Tr 
clause avoids the "forfeitures". This avoids the "improvements' 
This avoids "damage to" or "depreciation". This avoids lawsuit: 
This avoids attorney's fees. This avoids "rights of subsequent 
buyers". This avoids "assignees". 
Chief Justice McDonough stated in Cole v. Parker, suf 
and as Judge Worthen restated in Peck v. Judd, supra, and Judge 
Henriod reiterated in Carlson v. Hamilton, supra: 
It is not our prerogative to step in and 
renegotiate the contract of the parties . There 
is no reason why we should consider the vendee 
privileged . . unless the conditions . . are 
unconscionable . . . and we should recognize and 
honor the right of persons to contract freely and to 
make real and genuine mistakes when the dealings are 
at arms length . " 
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Courts of equity should not interfere except when sharp 
practice or a most unconscionable result is to be prevented. 
No fraud is claimed. No failure of the meeting of the 
minds. No failure to disclose, no sharp practice. No unconscionable 
results. This is the simple case of enforcing the contract. 
Why should it not be enforced? The parties so contracted. No 
illegal provisions, no provision against public policy, what basis 
is there for a court to step in and change the provisions? There 
is no claim that plaintiffs could not read. No claim that they 
did not read. No claim that they did not understand. According 
to value only a little over seventy-five percent of the property 
was sold. "No cause" has been shown why the provision of 3(a) 
should be ignored and set aside. 
SUMMATION 
In the case of Mortgage Investment Co., Inc. v. Toone, 
17 Utah 2d 152, 406 P.2d 30, in considering a Uniform Real Estate 
Contract it is stated: "This is a contract duly executed by the 
parties containing mutual obligations which are consideration for 
each other." So is the instant case. Covenants are "binding unless 
they are illegal, fraudulent, contrary to public policy, or 
inequitable," Jensen v. Nielsen, supra. 
Pecuniary inability of the defendant will not preclude 
a decree for payment of the price where such a decree is appro-
priate. Williston on Contracts. Vol. V, Revised Edition, p. 3476, 
§1422. There has been no claim that plaintiffs cannot pay. 
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CONCLUSION 
Baileys are praying: 
a. That the contract will be enforced as it is wri 
and 
b. That Baileys will be awarded their attorney fee 
and costs as provided in said contract for enforcement. 
Res~ectfully submitted, 
),a/~/__£;~H4U ~'V'T. Quentin Cannon 
/ Attorney for Defendants-Appellan 
~/ Ten Broadway Building, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
to Kay M. Lewis, Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents, 320 South 
300 East, Suite 1, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage prepaid, 
this day of November, 1979. 
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